In 1992, football overnight redefined the goalkeeper's job, and it was the best keepers in the world who were most exposed to it.

The back-pass rule, introduced for the 1992-93 season after a 1990 World Cup widely judged the dullest in living memory, with a record low of 2.21 goals per game, stopped a goalkeeper from picking up a ball that a teammate had deliberately kicked to him. He could no longer collect the pass and hold it while the clock ran down. He had to play it with his feet, under pressure, often with a striker closing him down.

The keepers had not become worse. Their reflexes were identical to the week before. What changed was the definition of the role, and that change exposed a skill most of them had never been asked to build, so a generation of specialists who had been excellent at the job as written found themselves measured against a job that had been rewritten without their input.

Some adapted. Most struggled. And the players who went on to define the modern position, the Neuers and the Edersons who operate as an eleventh outfielder, were eventually chosen against a specification that simply did not exist when the previous generation signed their contracts.

I think about that rule change every time a private equity firm buys a medical device company, because the same thing happens to the commercial leadership, and almost nobody sends the memo.

Why the money is moving now

The money is real and it is not slowing down. Medtech deal value reached $36.5 billion in the first half of 2026, following a 2025 that was the strongest in a decade, and private equity's share is growing, with PE-backed medtech deal value nearly doubling in 2025 to around $33 billion.

There is an unglamorous reason for the surge. Medtech has historically traded at a large premium to the wider market on an earnings basis, and that premium has all but vanished, meaning sponsors are buying quality assets at prices not available for years.

On the surface this reads as unambiguously good news, and it is fair to read it that way. Capital is returning to the sector, valuations that had fallen are being recognised, and founders and public shareholders are being paid. The announcements talk about growth, investment, and long-term value creation.

Underneath that language, something more specific is happening to the people running the commercial function, and it divides cleanly into two patterns that point in opposite directions.

The take-private: the same seat, a different game

The first is the take-private. When Blackstone and TPG took Hologic off the public market in an $18.3 billion deal, or when American Industrial Partners took Avanos private this year, the commercial leadership did not simply change owners. It changed the game it was playing.

The public-company commercial leader had been managing to quarterly guidance, analyst narratives, and a broad base of shareholders. The sponsor-owned version of that same role is managed to a value-creation plan, a two- to three-year hold, and a small group of operating partners who expect lean execution and direct, high-candour reporting. A ghSMART team writing in Harvard Business Review this month put it plainly: private equity demands immediate value creation and not every leader makes that transition successfully.

The carve-out: the scaffolding comes down

The second pattern is the carve-out, and it is the one this week's ResMed news belongs to. When ResMed agreed to sell MatrixCare to Frazier Healthcare Partners for $490 million, it was divesting a business it had acquired for $750 million in 2018 to concentrate on sleep and breathing health.

For the commercial leader who ran MatrixCare inside ResMed, the scaffolding is about to be removed. The parent's brand, its channel, its back office, and its balance sheet were all doing quiet work underneath the commercial number, and as a standalone Frazier portfolio company, that business now has to build a commercial function it never independently owned.

The same structure sits under ThermoFisher's sale of its microbiology unit to Astorg, and under Philips handing its emergency care business to a private-equity-backed platform. A division that was carried is now expected to carry itself.

The tell is not in the announcement

Here is the part that appears in none of the announcements. A take-private needs a commercial leader who is comfortable operating under EBITDA discipline and sponsor scrutiny, someone who can be measured weekly against a plan and hold their nerve. A carve-out needs a builder, someone who can stand up the brand, channel, and commercial infrastructure that the parent used to supply as a matter of course.

These are not two flavours of the same hire. They are different people, and putting one where the situation demanded the other is the mis-hire that looks fine at month six and comes apart at month fifteen.

The tell is not in the deal language, which is uniformly optimistic whichever pattern applies. The tell is in what the company hires in the two quarters after the deal closes. A carve-out that recruits a VP Sales before it recruits anyone to build its commercial operations has misread its own situation, and a take-private that reaches for a greenfield builder when it needed an operator running to a plan has made the same error in reverse.

So, the next time one of these deals crosses your feed, and there will be plenty, the useful question is not whether private equity likes medtech, because it plainly does. The useful question is which of the two rule changes just happened to the company, and whether the person still sitting in the commercial seat was hired for the job as it now reads or the job as it read the day before the deal closed.

The goalkeeper who was elite in 1991 was not dropped for being bad. He was dropped because the rule changed, and the people making the next set of hires were the only ones who had noticed in time.

If you have been through an acquisition from the inside, either as the commercial leader whose job was quietly rewritten or as the CEO who had to decide whether the incumbent could make the turn, I would be interested to hear which way it went and how early you knew.

Blair Anderson is the Founder and CEO of Innotech Recruit, a retained executive search firm specialising in commercial leadership hiring for US and UK medical device companies. Every search includes behavioural profiling of both the role and the candidate. Connect on LinkedIn or visit innotechrecruit.com.